The introduction of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on an underlying firm may influence its future access to external financing and, hence, its precautionary demand for cash. In this paper, we empirically estimate this effect of CDS trading, using a comprehensive sample of North American corporate CDS introductions between 1997 and 2009. We show that corporate cash holdings, as a proportion of assets, increase after the inception of CDS trading. This impact is significant, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity of CDS trading. We also find that the increase in the cash-to-assets ratio is greater for firms with relatively large amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with more limited access to financial markets. Moreover, the impact of CDS trading goes beyond the direct effects of bank lines of credit, which are generally less reliable sources of finance. 
I. Introduction
Credit derivatives, especially credit default swaps (CDS) 1,2 However, the continuing Eurozone crisis, and impending regulations such as the Dodd-Frank Act, present new challenges for the further development of the CDS market.
3 Therefore, understanding the real effects of CDS trading on corporations is of crucial importance to regulators, investors and firms alike. An important aspect of corporate financial decisions relates to cash holdings, with U.S. firms holding more cash than at any time in nearly half a century. 4 Our paper contributes to this discussion by presenting a careful empirical investigation of the impact of CDS on the liquidity policies of corporations.
Why should CDS trading on a corporation affect its cash holdings? Cash holdings are an important liquidity management tool for corporations. CDS can affect corporate cash holdings in several ways, by influencing the availability of external financing. 5 First, the introduction of CDS trading on a firm's debt increases the supply of credit from potential creditors, due to the availability of an effective tool for credit risk transfer. Second, given their CDS positions, the creditors' bargaining power is also enhanced, which, in turn, reduces the firm's incentive for strategic default, and raises its holding of pledgeable assets. Both these effects cause the firm's financial constraints to be relaxed after the inception of CDS trading on its debt.
Consequently, it may hold less cash and rely more on the financial market to manage its liquidity needs. Third, on the other hand, CDS can change the incentives of creditors vis- 3 To cite one specific example, in October 2011, European authorities banned "naked" sovereign CDS trading: Investors are not allowed to buy CDS protection without holding the underlying sovereign debt.
4 See, for example,"Companies Shun Investment, Hoard Cash", Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2011. 5 See, for example, Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011) .
1 a-vis the firm. Due to the nature of CDS trading, lenders can insure or even over-insure their credit exposure to the firm, so that when the firm is in financial distress, CDS-protected creditors may be tougher in renegotiation. In an extreme scenario, they may even push the firm into bankruptcy so as to obtain a payoff from their CDS position. Therefore, after the introduction of CDS trading, it may be harder for firms to obtain capital from creditors when liquidity is most needed, in situations of stress. Anticipating the tougher CDS-protected creditors, firms may increase their cash holdings, ex ante, in order to manage their potential liquidity needs in such an eventuality. Fourth, CDS can affect corporate cash holdings through feedback effects from CDS trading to cash holdings. The CDS spread is used extensively by market participants as a measure of credit quality. When corporate liquidity declines, the CDS market responds with a rising CDS spread. A sharp decline in cash holdings, resulting in a spike in the spread, could undermine market confidence in the firm, and reinforce the negative view about the corporation. 6 Therefore, it may be judicious for a firm to keep more cash on hand, especially after the introduction of CDS trading on its debt, since the CDS spread is sensitive to changes in its liquidity status. These potential channels suggest that CDS trading may affect corporate liquidity policy and, in particular, the firms' cash holdings. However, given the variety of the aforementioned influences of CDS trading on the cash holdings of firms, the direction and magnitude of this impact are ambiguous.
We use a comprehensive CDS transaction dataset for North American names to study the impact of CDS on cash holdings. Given the over-the-counter nature of the CDS market, it is hard to pin down the exact date of the introduction of CDS trading on a firm. Therefore, we rely on multiple data sources to identify the CDS launch date for a firm, including GFI Inc., the largest global interdealer broker with the most extensive records of CDS trades and quotes, CreditTrade, a major intermediary, especially in the early stages of the CDS market, and Markit, a data disseminator and vendor, which provides daily quotes from major 6 Anecdotal evidence indicates that a high CDS spread is associated with a dip in corporate cash holdings. For example, the CDS spread for Nokia soared to a record of 435 basis points in the first quarter of 2012, after its net cash dropped to 4.9 billion euros from 5.6 billion euros at the end of 2011. While Nokia was still rated by credit rating agencies at an investment grade rating of Baa2, the soaring CDS spread in fact implied a speculative grade rating of Ba2. This threatened the company's credit rating, which could potentially have been downgraded to junk. In response to this development, Nokia vowed to take "significant structural actions if and when necessary", including asset sales. (See "Nokia Swaps Trade Like Junk as Cash Dwindles: Corporate Finance", Bloomberg, April 12, 2012.) institutions. In our final sample, there are 901 CDS introductions from 1997 to 2009. We match these against the corporate cash holdings data from the Compustat database.
We analyze the level of cash holdings to identify the effect of CDS trading. However, the endogeneity of the effect of CDS introduction complicates the interpretation of this effect, since firms may be selected for CDS trading based on the impending increases in their cash holdings. CDS firms may be fundamentally different from non-CDS firms regarding their decisions about cash holdings. Besides using fixed effects controls, we address the endogeneity concern through three alternative approaches: a difference-in-difference comparison, a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis, and an instrumental variable (IV) approach. In addition, we employ a continuous measure of corporate CDS exposure, using the notional amount of the CDS contracts relative to debt outstanding, which is less affected by the selection problem, rather than a binary measure that merely indicates whether or not CDS are traded on a firm.
We find that the introduction of CDS trading on a firm leads to an increase in its cash holdings, after controlling for variables suggested by models of firms' demand for cash. This effect of CDS trading is both statistically significant and economically large. For our sample of CDS firms, the cash-to-assets ratio increases from 8.2% to 10.2%, once the CDS starts trading, a 24.4% increase. This positive relationship is significant, even after controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading. Moreover, the CDS effect is stronger for firms with larger notional amounts of CDS in relation to debt outstanding. We further find that the cash holdings of unrated firms, and firms with non-investment grade ratings, are more affected by CDS trading. This is perhaps because unrated and non-investment grade firms have less access to financial markets, compared with investment grade firms, to begin with, and thus fewer alternatives when their major debtors become tough CDS-protected creditors. In addition, firms relying on lines of credit may be even more affected by the CDS introduction, since lines of credit are less reliable in the presence of tougher CDS-protected creditors.
Our paper provides a new perspective on the real effects of the CDS market. Previous work has identified the impact of CDS on credit supply, the creditors' monitoring incentive, the reference entities' borrowing costs and default risk.
7 We show that CDS can affect pre- The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the related literature and the development of our hypotheses. In Section III, we describe our sample and empirical methods. Section IV presents our main empirical results about the effect of CDS on cash holdings.
Additional findings about the impact of firm characteristics and a discussion regarding alternative mechanisms for the effects of CDS trading are presented in section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Relevant Literature and Hypothesis Development
In the aftermath of the financial crisis during which CDS were alleged to have played a role in destabilizing markets, several researchers have studied the real effects of CDS trading.
In particular, they show that CDS contracts can affect the relationship between creditors and firms by changing the behavior of the creditors. 9 On the one hand, CDS provide an effective tool for credit risk transfer (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) Harford, and Li (2013) .
9 For example, Acharya and Johnson (2007, 2010) and Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2013) show that the CDS market provides a venue for insider trading by creditors.
10 See Duffee and Zhou (2001) , Morrison (2005) , Arping (2012), Thompson (2008) , Allen and Carletti (2006) , Parlour and Plantin (2008) , Parlour and Winton (2012), and Beyhaghi and Massoud (2012) . Ashcraft and Santos (2009) argue that such reduced monitoring may ultimately lead to a higher cost of debt. Che and Sethi (2012) model the impact of "naked" CDS positions on economic fundamentals. They argue that CDS can crowd out debt investors, reduce the firm's debt capacity, and increase its cost of debt. 4 creditors to retain an economic interest in the firm's cash flow but with no risk alignment with the other creditors who do not have such credit protection. Empty creditors tend to be tougher in the process of renegotiation due to the potential gain from their CDS position in the event of default. They even have an incentive to push a firm into inefficient default, or even bankruptcy, so as to obtain compensation from the payoff on their CDS holdings consequent to default.
11
Our paper is also closely related to the growing literature on corporate cash holdings.
12
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) identify four motives for corporate cash holdings and classify the literature examining corporate cash holdings accordingly: (1) the transaction motive, (2) the precautionary motive, (3) the agency motive, and (4) the tax motive.
13 Many recent papers focus on the precautionary motive for holding cash, which stems from expected financial constraints in the future, when access to capital markets becomes costly. As originally argued by Keynes (1936) , firms tend to build cash holdings to protect themselves against negative financial shocks in the future. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) formally model the empty creditor problem. Consistent with this theoretical prediction, a number of papers empirically investigate the impact of CDS on a firm's probability of restructuring/bankruptcy (Danis (2012), Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2012) , Peristiani and Savino (2011), and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013) ).
12 These papers include Disatnik, Ran, and Schmidt (2012) , Dittmar and Duchin (2011 ), McLean (2011 ), Denis and Sibilkov (2010 ), Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010 ), Nikolov and Whited (2013 , Riddick and Whited (2009 ), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006 ), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003 , and Dittmar, MahrtSmith, and Servaes (2003) .
13 The transaction motive was first analyzed by Baumol (1952) (followed by Miller and Orr (1966) ), who argued, using a formal inventory model in which it is less costly for large firms to convert non-cash assets into cash, that large firms tend to hold proportionately less cash due to economies of scale. While there is early evidence on these economies of scale, as documented by Mulligan (1997) , this explanation for corporate cash holdings may be less important today, given the increasing efficiency of markets in dealing with transactions for converting liquid assets into cash, as argued by Bates, Kahle, and Stultz (2009) . Other motives for corporate cash holdings include their real effects, such as those on the firms' product market performance (Fresard (2010) ).
14 See Keynes (1936 ), p. 196. 15 See Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998 ), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004 , Han and Qiu (2007 ), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009 ), Duchin (2010 , Acharya, Davydenko, and Strebulaev (2012), and Palazzo (2012) .
further insights into this stream of arguments by comparing the cash holdings of public and private firms.
16 In addition, taxes may play a role in determining a firm's cash holdings.
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) find that firms with foreign operating subsidiaries have higher cash holdings overseas, due to the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income into the United States.
17
In contrast to the previous CDS literature, which focuses on the behavior of creditors and the outcome for credit risk, this paper investigates the impact of CDS on the strategic actions of the managers of the reference firms in formulating their cash holding strategy. CDS trading can affect corporate cash holdings through its impact on the availability of external financing.
On the one hand, CDS trading relaxes credit supply constraints due to its risk mitigation effect, and the consequent enhanced bargaining power for creditors, thereby inducing lower precautionary cash holdings. On the other hand, when the firm is in distress, CDS-protected creditors tend to be excessively tough in renegotiations, and will accept a restructuring offer from the equity holders of the firm only if the terms are sufficiently attractive. In such circumstances, it is harder for firms to obtain financing when it is most needed. Given the potential effect of tougher creditors, firms rely more on cash holdings to manage their potential liquidity needs. If the tougher creditors effect outweighs the risk mitigation benefit, then we expect firms to hold more cash after CDS trading has been introduced:
The cash holdings of a firm increase following the introduction of trading in CDS contracts referencing its default.
The effect of CDS trading on the size of a firm's cash holdings may vary with its other characteristics, such as the amount of CDS contracts outstanding and its credit rating. The notional amount of CDS outstanding relative to the firm's debt outstanding can be used as a proxy for the CDS exposure of its creditors. Thus, we expect the effect of CDS trading to be larger for a firm with a greater CDS exposure. The credit rating is a conventional ex ante measure of a firm's financial constraints. Unrated firms and firms' with non-investment 16 The agency motive for holding cash dates back to Jensen (1986) , who argues that entrenched managers in companies with poor investment opportunities tend to build excess cash holdings, as evidenced in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) , Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) , and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) .
17 However, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) A firm can create a cushion for future contingencies when there is an adverse shock to operating cash flow in two ways, either by maintaining a cash buffer or by negotiating a line of credit, which may or may not actually be available when required. While holding cash has an opportunity cost in terms of foregone investment opportunities in real or financial assets, the line of credit involves a commitment fee that must be paid even if it is not tapped.
In addition, the line of credit may not be available in some states in the future, if the free cash flow turns out to be extremely poor and the covenants attached to the line of credit are breached. Moreover, a line of credit may generate additional rollover risk, since many credit lines are short term. The availability of liquidity from a line of credit also depends on the bank's ability and willingness to supply funds.
18 Therefore, while the firm may wish to reduce its reliance on cash due to the opportunity costs involved, it may at the same time wish to moderate its reliance on a line of credit so as to reduce the cost of the commitment fee, and more importantly the risk of non-availability of the line of credit when the firm is squeezed financially.
19
The impact of CDS trading will be accentuated when the firm has a line of credit, since its non-availability in the future may cause additional stress. As discussed above, lines of credit, which are not unconditional sources of finance, may become less reliable after the inception of 18 Demiroglu and James (2011) document the limitations of the use of credit lines to manage firm liquidity. Besides financial covenants, rollover risk, and the banks ability and willingness to lend, material adverse change (MAC) clauses and borrowing base formulae also affect the availability of credit lines, especially under conditions of stress.
19 A number of studies investigate firms' liquidity management strategies. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2012) find that a firm's exposure to aggregate risk affects its choice between cash and lines of credit. Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) investigate whether firms use lines of credit and cash to hedge different types of risks. They find that lines of credit are often used to explore future business opportunities in good times. On the other hand, firms use non-operational cash flows to hedge future cash flow shocks in bad times.
CDS trading, especially if bank lenders become tougher CDS-protected creditors. Therefore, we hypothesize that the impact of CDS is more significant for firms with lines of credit: 
III. Data and Empirical Specification

A. Data
We use CDS transaction data to identify a sample of firms with CDS contracts referencing their debt. Our CDS transaction data are from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. In contrast to the CDS quote data used in the previous literature, our data contain actual trading records with complete contractual information. (2013) for a detailed discussion of the data set. Similar, but much less extensive, data sources are used in Acharya and Johnson (2007), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) , and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2011) . 21 In our main analysis, we do not exclude financial firms. However, we drop financial firms from the sample as a robustness check. The results are quite similar in all cases and therefore we report our results only for the full sample. 8 ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. 22 We obtain credit rating data from
Compustat and FISD and line of credit data from Dealscan. 
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B. Empirical Specification
We employ a model along the lines of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stultz and Williamson (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) to investigate the effect of CDS on corporate cash holdings.
24
We assume that corporate cash holdings are determined by:
22 While the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets is the most conventional measure of cash holdings, we also checked alternative measures of the cash ratio. See footnote 25 below for further discussion.
23 Line of credit data have been used by several researchers including, most recently, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2012) . 24 This model for the level of cash holdings has been used extensively in the literature, for example by Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) , and Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) .
where Cash is the cash ratio measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets, X is a vector of determinants of cash holdings, and Y is a vector of other controls such as firm fixed effects. The regression controls in our empirical specification are motivated by the transaction and precautionary explanations for cash holdings, presented in the previous section. We include a set of fundamental determinants of the firm's cash holdings, including the industry cash flow risk (Industry Sigma), the ratio of cash flow to total assets (Cash Flow/Assets), a measure of the investment opportunities (Market to Book ), the logarithm of total assets (Size), the working capital ratio (Net Working Capital/Assets), the capital expenditure (Capital Expenditure), the leverage (Leverage), the ratio of research and development to sales (R&D/Sales), the dividend payment (Dividend Dummy), and the ratio of acquisitions to total assets (Acquisition Activity).
We estimate the impact of CDS trading on the corporate cash holdings using an indicator variable in the model specification, similarly to Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013), and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013) . CDS Trading is a dummy variable that equals one, for a CDS firm, after the inception of the firm's CDS trading, and zero before that. Therefore, the coefficient of interest is that of CDS Trading, which captures the impact of CDS on cash holdings, following the inception of CDS trading.
The regression analysis is conducted on the sample including CDS firms and non-CDS firms. Given the unobservable differences between firms, we control for firm fixed effects in our panel data analysis. Our main challenge in establishing the relationship between CDS trading and corporate cash holdings is the potential endogeneity of CDS trading. It is possible that there is a third (unobservable) factor affecting both the introduction of CDS trading and corporate cash holdings. In that case, the observed effects might not be caused by the CDS contracts, but rather the impact of this third factor. We use three methods to address this endogeneity concern: difference-in-difference estimation, PSM analysis, and an IV approach, as well as the use of continuous CDS exposure measures that are less affected by the selection issue rather than the dummy variable CDS Trading. We expect firms with a larger CDS exposure to be more likely to be affected by CDS trading and, therefore, to have a greater precautionary motive for holding cash. In addition, to assess whether the increase in cash holdings is related to firm characteristics such as credit ratings, we divide the sample firms into unrated, rated/non-investment grade, and investment grade groups. We also control for the direct effect of the availability of lines of credit, and investigate the effect of CDS trading on changes in the firms' cash holdings.
IV. CDS Trading and Cash Holdings: Empirical
Results
In this section, we first report the baseline results regarding the effects of CDS on cash holdings, with fixed effects in the sample of CDS firms, and with all non-CDS firms in the Compustat database as a control group. We then investigate whether the effects are robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading.
A. Changes in Cash Ratios around CDS Introduction
The summary statistics in Table I illustrate that there is an increase in the cash ratio for both CDS and non-CDS firms. To illustrate that CDS firms experience a more significant increase in this ratio, we focus on the changes in the cash ratio around the inception of CDS trading (defined as date 0). Figure 1 shows the changes in the cash ratios for CDS and non-CDS firms, from one year before the inception of CDS trading to zero (-1,0), one (-1,1), two (-1,2) or three (-1,3) years after its inception. Non-CDS matching firms are selected from a sample of firms that do not have CDS trading at any time during the whole sample period. For each CDS firm, we find a non-CDS matching firm that is in the same industry (measured by the 4-digit SIC code) and with the closest size (measured by total assets) to that of the CDS firm.
The average cash ratio increases for both CDS and non-CDS firms, but the increase is more pronounced for the CDS firms. We observe a 6% increase in the cash ratio, for both CDS firms and non-CDS matching firms, from year -1 to year 0. However, from year -1 to year +3, the increase in cash holdings for CDS firms is 0.7% more than that of the non-CDS matching firms. Given the mean cash ratio of 8% across the CDS firms and their non-CDS matching firms, the 0.7% additional increase in the cash ratio is economically significant. Therefore, from this figure, we obtain a preliminary indication that the increase in cash ratios is greater for CDS firms across years, subsequent to the initiation of CDS trading, compared to their non-CDS counterparts.
B. Impact of CDS on Cash Holdings: Baseline Results
We next estimate the CDS effects on cash holdings with appropriate control variables. The baseline analysis is conducted on the sample of both CDS and non-CDS firms, using quarterly observations. We control for time and firm fixed effects in all regressions. The variable of interest is CDS Trading, which equals one after the introduction of CDS trading on the firm's debt, and zero prior to that date. Therefore, the coefficient of CDS Trading captures the effect of CDS introduction on corporate cash holdings.
The baseline regression results are reported in Panel A of Table II, CDS Trading has a positive coefficient in Specification 1, suggesting that the presence of CDS contracts leads to higher cash ratios. Moreover, the effect of CDS Trading is significant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude is also large: compared to the sample mean cash ratio of 8.2% for CDS firms, the 1.7% addition to the cash ratio after CDS introduction in Specification 1 represents a 20.7% increase in the sample mean cash ratio. since they need to plan for future investment opportunities, and therefore hold more cash.
The coefficient of Acquisition Activity has the same sign as Capital Expenditure, which is as expected since acquisitions and capital expenditure are likely to be substitutes for each other.
The only coefficient that differs from our expectation is that of the Dividend Dummy. Firms with dividend payments would be expected to hold less cash, because they are likely to be less risky and less financially constrained. However, in our sample, we find a positive sign for this coefficient. This may be due to the changes in the relationship between cash holdings and firm characteristics over time, as discussed in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
We now turn to the analysis of the change in cash holdings, (∆ Cash/Assets), which we report in Panel B of trading and cash holdings, it is critical to appropriately control for the endogeneity of the former. In the following subsections, we formally address the endogeneity issue, using three alternative econometric approaches.
C. Propensity for the Introduction of CDS Trading
The endogeneity of CDS trading complicates the interpretation of the impact of CDS trading on cash holdings. It is possible that investors may anticipate the increase in cash holdings for a firm, and thus initiate CDS trading on it. If this selection effect were valid, our baseline finding may be contaminated by the endogeneity of CDS trading. Of course, we control for 31 Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) obtain a similar result. It is possible that these proxies for multinational operations are not sufficiently granular to discern the true drivers of additional cash held overseas. Further investigation of this issue is warranted.
firm fixed effects in all model specifications, which accounts for the time-invariant differences in characteristics between CDS and non-CDS firms, and may partially address this issue.
However, it is still necessary to address the endogeneity directly. To that end, we implement alternative econometric methodologies suggested by Li and Prabhala (2007) and Roberts and Whited (2012) to control for endogeneity by including instrumental variables. We use difference-in-difference estimation, PSM, and the IV approach, using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to re-estimate the CDS effect, after controlling for the selection of firms into the CDS sample.
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To implement these approaches, we first need to estimate a model for the selection of firms for CDS trading. Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013) and other studies, the prediction is estimated using a probit model with a dependent variable that equals one after the introduction of CDS trading, and zero otherwise. We use data from 1997 until the first month of CDS trading for CDS firms, and all observations for non-CDS firms, to predict the introduction of CDS trading for a firm.
We employ two instrumental variables: FX hedging activities by banks and underwriters,
Lender FX Usage, and the Tier One capital ratio of the lenders, Lender Tier 1 Capital.
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Both IVs relate to the lenders' hedging interest, but are not expected to affect firms' liquidity policy directly. Specifically, lenders with a larger FX hedging position are more likely, in general, to trade the CDS of their borrowers; banks with lower capital ratios have a greater need to hedge the credit risk of their borrowers via CDS. To construct the IVs, we first identify lenders and bond underwriters for our sample firms based on DealScan (for lenders) and FISD (for bond underwriters) data. We then obtain, from Federal Reserve call reports, data on the foreign exchange derivatives positions of these lenders and bond underwriters. For each firm in each quarter, Lender FX Usage is constructed as the average amount of foreign exchange derivatives usage for hedging purposes relative to its total assets, for banks that have either served as a lender or a bond underwriter to the firm, over the previous five years. To construct 32 Our approach is similar to those of Ashcraft and Santos (2009) Table III shows that CDS trading can be explained reasonably well by the explanatory variables, with a pseudo-R 2 s of around 38.9%. In the following analysis, we will use these CDS trading prediction models to conduct our difference-in-difference analyses, PSM analysis, and IV approach estimation, to re-examine the relationship between CDS trading and cash holdings. Specifically, we first construct our PSM sample based on the CDS prediction model:
for each CDS firm, we find one non-CDS matching firm with a similar propensity score for CDS trading. We use the PSM sample in two different ways. First, after constructing the sample, we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis to identify the treatment effect, i.e., the effect of the introduction of CDS trading. Second, we run the cash holding analysis, along the lines discussed in the previous section, on this matched sample. In constructing our PSM sample, we use all three prediction models in Table III for CDS trading as robustness checks.
Additionally, we use three different PSM criteria to choose matching firms: (1) the one non-CDS firm nearest, in terms of propensity score, to the CDS firm; (2) the one firm with the nearest propensity score, but within a difference of 1%; and (3) the two firms with propensity scores closest to the CDS firm. Furthermore, we implement the IV approach based on the CDS trading prediction model.
D. Difference-in-Difference Analysis
In this analysis, we compare the changes in the ratio of cash and marketable assets to total assets, a traditional measure of cash holdings, before and after the introduction of CDS trading, for CDS firms against their propensity-score-matched non-CDS firms. The results are shown in Table IV . They indicate that the difference-in-difference estimates of the cash ratio are both statistically and economically significant for the (t − 1, t + 1) and (t − 1, t + 2) event windows, using all three model specifications, with one or two matching firms. For example, when we use Model 3 to choose the "nearest-one propensity-score-matched firm, the cash ratio is 1.7% higher after CDS introduction, relative to the non-CDS matching firm in the (t − 1, t + 2) event window, a substantial increase over the cash ratio of the average CDS firm of 8.2%. While indicative of the effect of CDS trading on the cash holdings of firms, the results have to be interpreted with caution, since the event itself, CDS introduction, may be endogenous. We address this issue directly in the sub-sections below.
E. Propensity Score Matching
As distinguished from the baseline model that uses all non-CDS firms in the Compustat sample as the control group, firms in the restricted PSM sample are more comparable with each other. We use all three alternative PSM criteria discussed in the previous section to assess the robustness of our PSM results. However, only CDS prediction Model 3 in Table III is used to calculate the propensity scores in the results reported in Table V. holdings increase after CDS trading has been introduced. The economic magnitudes are also large: For example, compared to the sample mean cash ratio of 8% for this restricted sample, the 2.6% change in cash after CDS introduction in the results using "nearest one" matching represents a 32.5% increase in the mean cash ratio.
However, the PSM approach is only effective in controlling for the observable differences in firm characteristics between the treatment and control groups. It is possible that there is an unobservable variable that drives both the introduction of CDS trading and corporate cash holdings. If this were true, then PSM would not be able to effectively address the endogeneity in this setting. In the next section, we use the IV approach to address the endogeneity issue to alleviate this concern.
F. The Instrumental Variable Approach
Since it is possible that firms with greater future cash holdings are selected for CDS trading, there could also be unobserved omitted variables that drive both the selection of firms for CDS trading and cash holdings. To allow for the possibility of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across firms, we estimate a 2SLS model with IVs, where the indicator variable, CDS Trading, is treated as endogenous. Specifically, the cash holdings and the CDS contract status of a firm can be modeled as follows:
CDS Trading
Similarly to in the baseline model, the dependent variable here is the cash ratio, measured by the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. X is a vector of determinants of cash holdings, and Y is a vector of other controls such as firm fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is γ 1 , which captures the impact of CDS on corporate cash holdings. The variable
* represents the latent propensity of a firm to have CDS trading initiated on its debt. In the above specification, CDS Trading is allowed to be endogenous, due to corr(ϵ, ω) ̸ = 0. For identification, we include IVs that affect a firm's propensity for CDS introduction but do not affect its cash holdings directly, other than through the impact of CDS introduction.
Therefore, Z in equation (2) The results, so far, suggest that there are economically and statistically significant effects of CDS trading on corporate cash holdings. The CDS effect is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading using a variety of econometric approaches, including the difference-in-difference analysis, PSM and IV approaches. In the next section, we examine this issue further by constructing a continuous economic measure of CDS exposure, which is less affected by the selection concern. We also investigate further the cross-sectional differences in the CDS effect on cash holdings.
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V. Firm Characteristics and the CDS Effect: Alternative Mechanisms
The effect of CDS trading on corporate cash holdings may vary with firm characteristics. In this section, we investigate whether the CDS impact is greater for firms with larger amounts of CDS outstanding, those with unrated/non-investment grade ratings, and entities with bank lines of credit. We also discuss the implications of these results for the validity of alternative mechanisms for the impact on cash holdings.
A. Outstanding CDS Positions
Instead of using the regime variable, CDS Trading, which equals one after the introduction of CDS trading, we utilize detailed information about the notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding to construct a continuous measure of CDS exposure. Continuous economic variables also help further address the self-selection concern in analyzing the effect of CDS trading.
As pointed out by Li and Prabhala (2007) , the magnitude of the selection variable (for CDS trading) introduces an independent source of variation and aids the identification of the treatment effect, while ameliorating the self-selection concern. In addition, the continuous CDS outstanding measure is also a proxy for the severity of the CDS effect: The larger is the amount of CDS outstanding, the greater will be the benefits to the CDS-protected creditors, and therefore the tougher the empty creditors are likely to be in the process of re-negotiation.
Moreover, the amount of CDS outstanding is a proxy for CDS market liquidity; hence, the CDS spread for firms with more CDS outstanding and, hence, with a more liquid CDS market, will be more sensitive to new information, such as the firm's credit and liquidity status.
Therefore, the feedback effect from the CDS market to the bond market will be more severe for firms with larger amounts of CDS outstanding. Thus, both the tougher creditor mechanism and the CDS feedback mechanism predict that firms have a greater incentive to hold cash reserves when there are proportionately more CDS contracts outstanding on their debt.
We measure the level of corporate CDS outstanding by the ratio of the notional dollar amount of CDS contracts outstanding to the total dollar amount of debt outstanding at the same time, CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt. We scale the CDS position by total debt in order to relate the dollar amount of CDS outstanding to the potential total demand of the creditors. We conjecture that firms with greater relative proportions of CDS outstanding are likely to be more vulnerable to the CDS effect. Firms' CDS exposure measure might be endogenous, since market participants choose the amount of CDS to trade. We model CDS
Notional Outstanding/Total Debt, and use Instrumented CDS Notional Outstanding/Total
Debt in the cash holdings analysis.
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Our estimation results are presented in Table VII .
Specification 1 uses CDS Notional
Outstanding/Total Debt as the measure of CDS exposure. The positive and significant coeffi-
cient of this variable indicates that CDS trading increases cash holdings. Specification 2 uses
Instrumented CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt. Again, we find a significant positive coefficient. These findings suggest that, the greater is the CDS exposure, the higher are the corporate cash holdings. The effect is robust after controlling for the potential endogeneity of the amount of CDS outstanding.
B. Credit Ratings and CDS Effect
The effect of CDS on corporate cash holdings may vary with the credit rating of the issuing firm. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) find that firms facing greater capital market frictions, i.e., financially constrained firms, are more likely to retain more cash from their free cash flows. Similarly, financially constrained firms have fewer alternative external financing options when their lenders become tougher CDS-protected creditors. Consequently, they tend to build greater cash holdings after the introduction of CDS trading on their debt.
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Therefore, we expect the cash holdings of financially constrained firms to be more affected by CDS trading. This prediction is also consistent with the argument regarding the tougher 35 The prediction model used for CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt is similar to that used in Table III . Lender FX Usage and Lender Tier 1 Capital Ratio are again used as IVs.
36 For firms without credit ratings, the CDS spread provides valuable information about the firm's credit quality. Consequently, it is even more valuable for these firms to maintain liquidity, so as to maintain a reasonable CDS spread. Thus, the CDS feedback effect argument also predicts that unrated firms are more affected by CDS trading. creditor mechanism. Table VIII examines In measuring the impact of CDS trading on cash holdings, a valid concern, therefore, is that firms may substitute lines of credit for cash. As a consequence, the predicted increase in cash holdings due to CDS trading may not occur. To address this possibility, we re-estimate the model of the determinants of cash, after controlling for the direct effect of lines of credit.
C. Lines of Credit and CDS Trading
Line of Credit is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a line of credit. The results from this estimation are reported in Table IX . Specification 1 lists the baseline cash results from Table II 
D. Discussion of Alternative Mechanisms
CDS trading may exacerbate the capital market frictions faced by firms. Specifically, the effect of CDS may arise from alternative mechanisms, such as the credit supply, tougher creditors and the CDS feedback effect. However, the credit supply mechanism predicts a decrease in cash holdings after the introduction of CDS trading. Given the increase in cash holdings after CDS introduction, the tougher creditor and CDS feedback effect mechanisms tend to 24 dominate. When the firm tries to obtain additional liquidity by issuing new debt, the terms of this debt will need to be attractive enough for CDS-protected investors.
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of CDS on corporate cash holdings. We find evidence that CDS trading on firms' debt increases corporate cash holdings. To estimate the CDS effect, we use a comprehensive data set of North American corporate CDS introductions between 1997
and 2009. First, we estimate the cash holding model in a sample of CDS firms, using all non-39 As argued by Demiroglu and James (2011), bank credit lines are typically short-term; for example, during the 1996-2009 period, about 21% of new credit lines had a stated maturity of less than 365 days.
40 Sufi (2009) shows that "cash flow and leverage ratios are the most common component of financial covenants, and they are also the most powerful predictors of covenant violations." Moreover, when the firm violates its debt covenants, the reduction in the availability of lines of credit is significant. Given the increase in leverage (as documented by Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013) ) after CDS introduction, CDS firms might be more likely to violate existing covenants. In contrast to this prediction, Shan and Tang (2013) find that firms' debt covenants are loosened after CDS trading, since their CDS positions partially alleviate creditors' concerns regarding their conflict of interests with shareholders. However, CDS can still affect the availability of credit lines through rollover risk, banks willingness to lend etc.
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CDS firms in Compustat as the control group. The cash ratios for firms with CDS traded on them increase by 2%, on average, after the introduction of CDS trading. Given the mean cash ratio of 8.2% for CDS firms, this increase is economically significant. We then control for the endogeneity of CDS introduction using three different econometric methods: the differencein-difference, propensity score matching and instrumental variable approaches. We further construct a continuous CDS exposure measure, which is less affected by the selection issue.
Moreover, the impact of CDS on cash holdings is greater for firms with limited access to the financial market and for firms with bank lines of credit. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of a model motivated by tougher CDS-protected creditors: Creditors tend to be excessively tough after the introduction of CDS trading (as argued by Hu and Black (2008) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011)). Anticipating the potential actions of these tougher creditors, firms hold more cash ex ante to manage their liquidity needs.
Our research contributes to the ongoing debate about the real effects of CDS. In contrast to the redundant security argument that is the basis of derivatives pricing, growing empirical evidence suggests that CDS increase the credit supply, and the reference firms' leverage, borrowing costs, and bankruptcy risk (Aschcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013), and Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2013)). In contrast to these research, we delve further into the firms' responses to the increase in credit risk by showing that CDS affect corporate liquidity policies. These findings have implications for the discussion of the welfare effects of CDS markets. Indeed, CDS can increase the credit supply and the reference firms' leverage.
The increase will be welfare-enhancing if the additional funding is used to finance valuable new investment projects. However, firms could simply keep the funds raised in the form of corporate cash reserves to satisfy their precautionary motive. In that case, the increased borrowing capacity may not translate into higher welfare benefits for the economy. This figure plots the changes in cash ratios for firms with credit default swaps (CDS) and their corresponding matching firms, from one year before the inception of CDS trading to zero, one, two or three years after the inception of CDS trading. Matching firms are selected based on industry and size. The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. The CDS data come from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in our sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009.
Table I Credit Default Swaps Trading and Cash Ratios by Year
This table reports the distribution of firms in our sample, including those with credit default swaps (CDS) traded, and their average cash ratios, by year, between 1997 and 2009. The overall sample of firms is taken from Compustat, and includes all companies in that database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. We measure the cash ratio as cash and marketable securities divided by total assets. The first column in the table is the year. The second column shows the total number of U.S. companies included in the Compustat database. The third column reports the number of firms for which CDS trading was initiated during that year. The fourth column presents the number of firms with active CDS trading during each year. The last two columns report average cash ratios for non-CDS and CDS firms respectively. 
Table II Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Cash Holdings
This table presents estimates of the effect of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate cash holdings. Panel A models the level of cash. Panel B models the change in cash. Panel C adds a control for firms with foreign sales/multinational firms. Foreign Sales/Total Sales is the ratio of export sales to total sales. Following Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2013), we define Multinational as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm makes 25% of its sales abroad. Foreign sales data are drawn from the Compustat historical segment file. Industry Sigma is the industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Cash Flow/Assets is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Net Working Capital/Assets is measured as net working capital minus cash, divided by total assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividend Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the corporate cash holdings, we include CDS variables in the model specifications. CDS Trading is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CDS traded on its debt, one year before month t. The coefficient of interest is that of CDS Trading, which captures the impact of CDS trading on cash holdings after the inception of CDS trading. The sample period is from 1997 to 2009, based on quarterly observations. The overall sample of firms is drawn from Compustat, and includes all companies in that database during 1997-2009. The CDS data come from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) 
Table III Probability of Credit Default Swaps Trading
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit default swaps (CDS) trading, obtained using a probit model. Propensity scores are estimated based on the model parameters. ln(Assets) is the logarithm of the firm's total asset value. Leverage is defined as the ratio of book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity, where book debt is the sum of short-term debt and 50% of long-term debt, and market equity is the measure of the number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price. ROA is the firm's return on assets. r it−1 − r mt−1 is the firm's excess return over the past year. Equity Volatility is the firm's annualized equity volatility. PPENT/Total Asset is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. Sales/Total Asset is the ratio of sales to total assets. EBIT/Total Asset is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. WCAP/Total Asset is the ratio of working capital to total assets. RE/Total Asset is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Cash/Total Asset is the ratio of cash to total assets. CAPX/Total Asset is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Rated is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is rated. Senior Unsecured Debt is the ratio of senior unsecured debt to total debt. Lender Size is a measure of the size of the lending banks and underwriters. Lender Credit Derivatives measures the credit derivative activities of the lenders. Lender FX Usage is a measure of the FX hedging activities of the lending banks and underwriters, and Lender Tier 1 Capital is the Tier One capital ratio of the lenders. The sample period is 1997-2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) This table presents the estimates of the effect of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate cash holdings in a sample including firms with CDS and non-CDS propensity score-matched firms. Propensity scorematched firms are selected based on propensity scores estimated from model 3 of the probability of CDS trading presented in Table III . Industry Sigma is the industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Cash Flow/Assets is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Net Working Capital/Assets is measured as net working capital minus cash, divided by total assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividend Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the corporate cash holdings, we include CDS variables in the model specifications. CDS Trading is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. The coefficient of interest is that of CDS Trading, which captures the impact of the inception of CDS trading on cash holdings. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. The CDS data come from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. This table presents the estimates of the effect of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate cash holdings, in a sample including firms with CDS and all non-CDS firms. The CDS impact is measured as the total notional CDS outstanding, scaled by the book value of the total debt (CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt) or the Instrumented CDS Notional Outstanding/Total Debt. Industry Sigma is the industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Cash Flow/Assets is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Net Working Capital/Assets is measured as net working capital minus cash, divided by total assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividend Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. The overall sample of firms is drawn from Compustat, and includes all companies in that database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
Table VIII Credit Ratings and the CDS Effect
This table investigates credit ratings and the effect of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate cash holdings. Unrated equals one if there is no credit rating on the firm. Non-investment Grade equals one if the firm's credit rating is of non-investment grade. Industry Sigma is the industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Cash Flow/Assets is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Net Working Capital/Assets is measured as net working capital minus cash, divided by total assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividend Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the corporate cash holdings, we include CDS variables in the model specification. CDS Trading is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. The coefficients of interest are those of CDS Trading, CDS Trading*Unrated, and CDS Trading*Non-investment Grade, which capture the impact of the inception of CDS trading on cash holdings. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. The overall sample of firms is drawn from Compustat, and includes all companies in that database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.) Cash/Assets (1) 
Table IX Lines of Credit and the CDS Effect
This table presents the estimates of the effect of credit default swaps (CDS) on corporate cash holdings after controlling for the line of credit. Line of credit data are drawn from Dealscan. Line of Credit is a dummy equal to one if the firm has a line of credit. Industry Sigma is the industry cash flow risk, measured by the mean cash flow volatility across two-digit SIC codes. Cash Flow/Assets is the ratio of cash flow to total assets, where cash flow is defined as the earnings after interest and related expenses, income taxes, and dividends. Market to Book is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Net Working Capital/Assets is measured as net working capital minus cash, divided by total assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Leverage is measured as the book value of the long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D to sales. Dividend Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm pays a common dividend. Acquisition Activity is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the corporate cash holdings, we include CDS variables in the model specification. CDS Trading is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CDS traded on its debt one year before month t. The coefficients of interest are those of CDS Trading and CDS Trading*Line of Credit, which captures the impact of the inception of CDS trading on cash holdings. The sample period is 1997-2009, based on quarterly observations. The overall sample of firms is drawn from Compustat, and includes all companies in the database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are taken from CreditTrade and the GFI Group. There are 901 firms in the sample that have CDS traded at some point during the sample period of June 1997 to April 2009. (*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Cash/Assets (1) 
